Metaphor - Key Sources

Metaphor Theory and Source–Target Mapping

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This work in cognitive linguistics provided the foundational concept: metaphors operate by mapping structure from a familiar source domain (e.g., human cognition) onto a less familiar target domain (e.g., algorithmic processes). The mapping isn't arbitrary, it imports specific inferences and hides others.

Key insight for prompt design: To analyze metaphor, I needed to instruct the model to identify both domains, describe the structural mapping between them, and articulate what the mapping conceals.

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Typologies of Explanation

Brown, R. (1963). Explanation and Experience in Social Science. Routledge.

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Robert Brown's classic work distinguishes between different modes of explanation: genetic (how it came to be), functional (how it works), intentional (why it "wants" something), dispositional (why it "tends" to act), and so on.

The System Instructions are provided with examples using the following table:

Type	Definition	Lens
Genetic	Traces development or origin.	How it came to be.
Functional	Describes purpose within a system.	How it works (as a mechanism).
Empirical	Cites patterns or statistical norms.	How it typically behaves.
Theoretical	Embeds behavior in a larger framework.	How it's structured to work.
Intentional	Explains actions by referring to goals/desires.	Why it "wants" something.
Dispositional	Attributes tendencies or habits.	Why it "tends" to act a certain way.
Reason-Based	Explains using rationales or justifications.	Why it "chose" an action.

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Metaphor Theory and Source–Target Mapping​

Typologies of Explanation​

Metaphor Theory and Source–Target Mapping

Typologies of Explanation